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 IS CYBERATTACK THE NEXT PEARL HARBOR? 
 
Lawrence J. Trautman∗ 
Central Intelligence Agency Director, Leon Panetta, states in 
his Secretary of Defense confirmation testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that, “[t]he next Pearl Harbor that we 
confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples America’s 
electrical grid and its security and financial systems.”1 
Cyberattacks have become a daily threat to businesses, consumers, 
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1 Anna Mulrine, CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be a 
Cyberattack, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 9, 2011), 
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and all nation states resulting in the profound loss of economic 
assets and intellectual property. Cyberattack represents a real 
threat to geopolitical stability and world peace. This article depicts 
a fictional scenario of what a cyberattack on a massive scale might 
look like and examines current and historical factors to better 
understand how such a devastating cyberattack is set in motion 
and how we might avoid it. 
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IS CYBERATTACK THE NEXT PEARL HARBOR? 
“Attacks against us are increasing in frequency, scale, 
sophistication and severity of impact. Although we must be 
prepared for a catastrophic, large-scale strike, a so-called ‘Cyber 
Armageddon,’ the reality is that we’ve been living with a constant 
and expanding barrage of cyber attacks for some time.” 
    Hon. James R. Clapper 
    Director of National Intelligence 
    February 26, 2015 2 
I. OVERVIEW 
Central Intelligence Agency Director, Leon Panetta, stated in 
his Secretary of Defense confirmation testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that, “the next Pearl Harbor that we 
confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples America’s 
electrical grid and its security and financial systems.”3 
Cyberattacks have become a daily threat to businesses, consumers, 
and all nation states, resulting in the profound loss of economic 
assets and intellectual property. Cyberattack represents a real threat 
to geopolitical stability and world peace.4 
                                                
 2 James Clapper, Opening Statement of Worldwide Threat Assessment 
Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee (2015), 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/209-congressional-
testimonies-2015/1175-dni-clapper-opening-statement-on-the-worldwide-threat-
assessment-before-the-senate-armed-services-committee (last visited Mar. 25, 
2016) (statement made by Hon. James R. Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence). 
 3 Anna Mulrine, supra note 1. 
 4 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: 
Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 (2012); 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 269 (2014); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, 
Haley Proctor, Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The 
Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817 (2012); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber 
Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533 
(2010); Communist Chinese Cyber-Attacks, Cyber-Espionage and Theft of 
American Technology:Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 112-14 (2011); Nathan 
Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1503 (2013); 
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This article depicts a fictional scenario of what a cyberattack 
on a massive scale might look like. First, is a possible scenario of 
such a cyberattack. Second, for historical perspective, the 
December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor is presented. Third is a 
review of contemporary and credible warnings. Fourth is a 
discussion about the privacy versus national security debate, and 
geopolitical developments that might determine how a cyber drama 
is played-out on the world stage. Fifth, the question of what is to 
be done is addressed. Next, the 1946 Congressional Joint 
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack’s 
recommended principles (designed to prevent the repetition of such 
a future attack) is reviewed with our contemporary environment in 
mind. 
II. ZERO DAY 
“And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you 
free.” 
    John 8:32 (King James)5 
                                                                                                         
Scott Shackelford & Amanda Craig, Beyond The New ‘Digital Divide’: 
Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance 
and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014); Christina 
Parajon Skinner, An International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage, 
46 CONN. L. REV. 1165 (2014); Peter Swire, A Model for When Disclosure 
Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?, 2 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (2004); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and 
the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421 
(2011); Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for 
Cyber Weapons, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364658; Kristen Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of 
Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317 (2015); Peter Sommer & Ian Brown, Reducing 
Systemic Cybersecurity Risk (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working 
Paper No. IFP/WKP/FGS(2011)3), 2011) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743384; 
William Banks, Developing Norms for Cyber Conflict (2016) (unpublished 
paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2736456 (depicting 1982 massive explosion of 
the trans-Siberian pipeline caused by malware apparently inserted into Canadian 
software). 
 5 John 8:32 (King James). 
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Zero Day 
What happened? It’s a Tuesday morning in February. Without 
fanfare or warning, Americans awake to find that nothing works. 
In Wellesley, Massachusetts, sixth graders at Horatio H. 
Hunnewell Elementary School on Cameron Street awoke later than 
usual because alarm clocks failed to provide their normal wake-up 
call. Meanwhile, just a few miles away in South Boston, the fire 
fighters of Engine Company 39, Ladder 18 receive delayed notice 
of homes ablaze because the phone system is down. First 
responders arrive at their destinations later than normal because 
traffic lights are not functioning. Everywhere this morning, fire 
fighters are busy dealing with fires, hamstrung because fire 
hydrants are not operational due to electrical outages that cause 
pumps to fail. Those individuals reliant on electrical medical 
devices are struggling, and confusion is widespread. 
This Tuesday morning, the electrical grids in the eastern and 
western United States fail.6 As a result, all states except for Texas, 
Alaska and Hawaii (which have their own grids) are without 
power. The government declares a state of emergency and 
promises to locate the problem and restore services as soon as 
possible. Emergency generators provide power for some essential 
services such as hospitals and public broadcasters. However, 
schools are closed, and public transportation proves intermittent at 
best. Inoperable traffic signals cause automobile travel to slow to a 
snail’s pace in major cities. Phone landlines are down for most 
businesses. Cell towers don’t work because of power loss. Some 
people use this “holiday” from work and school to venture out for 
necessities. However, stocked groceries and operating gas stations 
prove hard to come by since few sources have their own power 
generators. Most restaurants are unable to open due to lack of 
electricity and public transportation for their employees. With 
memories of 9/11 and the use of air transportation for purposes of 
                                                
 6 See generally TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK; A NATION 
UNPREPARED; SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH (Crown Pub., 2015) (depicting a 
future attack on U.S. power grids and its aftermath). See also Richard J. 
Kisielowski, Hey America! Let’s Get Smart: The Need for a Reliable Modern 
Smart Electrical Grid Resistance to Cyberattacks, 24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 139 
(2015). 
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terrorism still too fresh,7 immediate orders are given for all air 
traffic to land at the nearest possible airport. All originating air 
travel is cancelled, resulting in the stranding of travelers 
numbering in the tens of thousands, usually at unfamiliar airports. 
Even so, just before all aircraft could land, reports of compromised 
aircraft control systems are reported. Also, within recent memory 
are the terrorist attacks at Fort Hood,8 the Boston Marathon,9 
Paris,10 San Bernardino,11 and Brussels.12 
                                                
 7 See generally Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. 
INT’L L. (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=391640; Michael A. Hitt, Katalin 
Takacs Haynes & Roy Serpa, Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century, 53 
BUSINESS HORIZONS 437 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995786 (observing 
that “the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington produced a significant loss of lives, and changed the political and 
business landscapes for many decades to come”); Jason Bram, James Orr & 
Carol Rapaport, Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York 
City, 8 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. (Nov. 2002), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=802786; Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. 
Simon, The Impact of 9/11 on Road Fatalities: The Other Lives Lost to 
Terrorism, 41 APPLIED ECON. (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=677549 (finding 
that following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, driving fatalities increased 
significantly as travelers used autos rather than air, and then this effect 
weakened over time as drivers returned to air transportation); John Yoo & 
Robert J. Delahunty, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct 
Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that 
Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2002), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=331202. 
 8 See generally Tung Yin, Were Timothy Mcveigh and the Unabomber the 
Only White Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049221. 
 9 See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public 
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. 
U.L. REV. 21 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373527; Matt Saldaña, 
Counterterrorism Roadblocks: Constitutional Under the Fourth Amendment?, 
40 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 585 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424314; Alexander 
J. Blenkinsopp, Note, A Different Perspective on the Boston Lockdown, 48 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271595; Joanna Wright, 
Applying Miranda’s Public Safety Exception to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: Restricting 
Criminal Procedure Rights by Expanding Judicial Exceptions, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 136 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333989; Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, Lessons on Terrorism and ‘Mistaken Identity’ from Oak Creek, with a 
Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76 
(2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263565; W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. 
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California 
The Urth Café on Melrose is famously the breakfast hub and 
meeting spot of working Hollywood and movie industry 
executives. But this morning, no spinach & feta omelets are 
served. Like Florida, southern Texas and Arizona, the West 
Coast—particularly southern California—benefits from a climate 
that is hospitable even during February. At the macro level, 
widespread losses of electrical power result in store closures and 
quicker defrost and spoilage of existing grocery store foodstuffs. 
The inability to pump gas at most service stations quickly results in 
long lines of cars waiting to fuel at the few open gas stations 
(before resupply trucks fail to make deliveries). Abandoned cars 
left on streets and highways soon become a major problem for the 
already congested Los Angeles area. 
In northern California, Sandhill Road in Menlo Park, just a few 
minutes from Stanford University, is “ground zero” for America’s 
venture capital industry. This morning, many pillars of venture 
finance find themselves locked out of their offices when front door 
electronic security devices fail to operate. Classes are cancelled at 
Stanford, and lunch will not be served today along Fisherman’s 
Wharf in San Francisco. 
Even during February, the impact of global warming and 
wildfires prove to be problematic this year in the western United 
States. Lack of transportation hinders both first responder 
emergency services, such as firefighting efforts, and the ability to 
move agricultural products to heavily populated areas. Widespread 
                                                                                                         
Zeckhauser, Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism-
Risk Assessments (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 16-003) (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2692253. 
 10 See Adam Nossiter, Aurelien Breeden & Katrin Bennhold, Paris Attack 
Was the Work of Three Teams, An ‘Act of War’ By ISIS, France Asserts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2015, at A1; see also Andrew Higgins & Milan Schreuer, ‘They 
Did Not Give Anybody a Chance’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2015, at A1. 
 11 See Devlin Barrett, Saeed Shah & Tamara Audi, Focus Turns to Wife’s Role 
in Assault, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2015, at A6; Damian Paletta, Siobhan Hughes & 
Jim Carlton, Shooters Were ‘Radicalized,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2015, at A1. 
 12 See Natalia Drozdiak, Gabriele Steinhauser & Matthias Verbergt, Terror 
Strikes Europe’s Heart, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2016, at A1. 
240 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 233 
hunger soon becomes the primary cause of civil unrest and crime. 
Frightened people quickly resort to desperate measures. 
For California, as in most of the United States, most 
component parts of the electrical grid are now many decades old. 
Critically important for transferring electrical power between 
circuits, large power transformers average forty years old, with 
many in operation for an excess of seventy years.13 After power 
failures from disasters such as Hurricane Sandy on the U.S. east 
coast, the grid’s “reliability, effectiveness, and affordability are 
increasingly being brought into question.”14 However, not enough 
was done to fix the grid. 
National Capital Area 
This morning, breakfast is not available at the Hay Adams 
Hotel across from the White House. Nor were the doors open for 
business at Busboys and Poets at 2021 14th Street, NW.15 All the 
typical tourist attractions like the Smithsonian Museums remain 
closed, along with public schools. Classes are cancelled at 
American, Catholic, Georgetown, George Washington, Howard, 
and the University of the District of Columbia. 
The bureaucratic army of the Potomac is estimated to employ 
over 500,000 federal workers, not counting the thousands of 
lawyers and consultants that perform work primarily for the U.S. 
government.16 Almost all remain at home this day. As any 
thoughtful cyber warfare strategist might have predicted, an attack 
on the metropolitan Washington, DC – Baltimore metroplex is a 
focal point of the hostilities. Primary targets were the cyber 
warriors located at the suburban Washington, DC headquarters of 
                                                
 13 Brian Warshay, Upgrading the Grid: How to Modernize America’s 
Electrical Infrastructure, FOREIGN AFF.,  Mar.–Apr. 2015, at 125. 
 14 Id. 
 15 BUSBOYS AND POETS, http://www.busboysandpoets.com/ (last visited Nov. 
17, 2016). 
 16 See Federal Employees By State, GOVERNING.COM, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/federal-employees-workforce-numbers-by-
state.html (reporting data on the concentration of federal employees compiled 
from 2013 Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics). 
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the National Security Agency (NSA),17 the Northern Virginia 
defense community represented by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA),18 and the almost 30,000 employees who work at the 
Pentagon.19 In addition to these well-known agencies are the many 
whom the press seldom acknowledges as they engage in the 
mission of defending the United States against attacks both 
physical and virtual. 
Day Three: Internet Backbone and Fiber Cable Destroyed 
Because most had not enjoyed Internet availability since Zero 
Day due to lack of power, the sabotage and loss of the undersea 
international fiber cable system a few days after the initial attack 
on the U.S. power grid remained generally unnoticed. This 
submarine fiber optic network is “the physical infrastructure that 
underpins the virtual cloud of cyberspace.”20 Since its advent in 
1977, the fiber optic cable system has experienced rampant 
growth. Thomas Friedman observes, “around the year 2000 we 
entered a whole new era, Globalization 3.0 . . . . [which brings] the 
newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete 
globally.”21 Friedman contends this development allows rapid 
circulation of digital content at almost no cost, thus creating global 
collaboration. Therefore, “[g]lobalization 3.0 is going to be more 
and more driven not only by individuals but also by a much more 
diverse—non-western, non white—group of individuals. 
Individuals from every corner of the flat world are being 
empowered.”22 
                                                
 17 Contact Us, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, 
https://www.nsa.gov/about/contact-us/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 18 Contact CIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/index.html# (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 19 Barbara Maranzani, 9 Things You May Not Know About the Pentagon, 
HISTORY.COM (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/9-things-you-may-
not-know-about-the-pentagon. 
 20 Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: 
An Intersectional Analysis, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 57, 58 (2015). 
 21 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 3.0: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 10 (Picador 2007). 
 22 Id. at 11. 
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To put the loss of oceanic submarine cable communication 
infrastructure into perspective, consider that during 2010, the 
United Nations recognized “submarine communications cables as 
‘critical communications infrastructure’ and ‘vitally important to 
the global economy and the national security of all States.’”23 
Davenport continues to warn that “submarine fiber optic cables 
provide the vast majority of international telecommunications—
some 95% overall.”24 As the Internet’s backbone, submarine cables 
carry over $10 trillion daily in transactions for over 8,300 financial 
institutions on the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Transactions) network.25 
Boston—Days, Then Weeks Later 
It is nine degrees in suburban Boston, and for most residents 
there has been no heat for several weeks. Almost overnight, money 
has no meaning; bartering replaces currency for transactions, and 
the American economy grinds to a halt. Banks are closed, and 
ATM machines fail to operate.  
Down on Wall Street, although emergency backup systems are 
capable of trading securities, orders to buy or sell are not received 
in New York, as Boston area brokerage offices lack telephone 
service and have no ability to communicate. Commerce ceases 
nationwide as the power grid continues to stay down. Backup 
systems powered by fossil fuels soon deplete their supplies of coal, 
gas, diesel, kerosene, et cetera. Much like the great blizzard of 
2015, snow is piled up everywhere.26 Schools have not reopened 
since Zero Day. Public transportation remains closed. After several 
days, snow removal is finally abandoned for lack of fuel and 
because workers choose to be at home with their families. 
                                                
 23 Davenport, supra note 20, at 62 (citing G.A. Res. 65/37, ¶ 121 (Dec. 7, 
2010)). 
 24 Davenport, supra note 20, at 62 (citing LIONEL CARTER ET AL., SUBMARINE 
CABLES AND THE OCEANS: CONNECTING THE WORLD 8 (2009), 
http://www.iscpc.org/publications/ICPC-UNEP_Report.pdf). 
 25 Davenport, supra note 20, at 63. 
 26 Alex Sosnowski, How Did East Coast Blizzard of 2015 Play Out?, 
ACCUWEATHER (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-
news/what-happened-to-the-forecast/41294989. 
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Ambulance, fire, and police services quickly become missing in 
action. But this time, things are different. 
It’s been almost ten days now since electricity went out across 
forty-seven states. For a while, hospitals are okay with their 
backup power sources. Within a week or so, many start to run out 
of fuel to power their generators. At first, elective surgeries are 
postponed. Several days later as power becomes increasingly 
scarce, medical monitoring machines fail and lab testing stops. 
Doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers cannot make their 
way between home and work. By now, most hospitals are 
desperately understaffed, without fuel or other sources of 
functioning power. Many hospitals simply fail and services stop, 
with no place to send their patients. The sick start to die and bodies 
pile up. Without electricity, gas stations cannot pump gas, 
streetlights and traffic signals are dark, and those who can make it 
through the snow soon empty grocery stores of all remaining 
usable food. 
At sub-freezing temperatures, humans and their habitats are in 
peril. As buildings shed their heat, staying warm becomes a 
challenge. The elderly and the very young succumb first. After the 
first few days, finding fire for warmth becomes difficult and causes 
panic. After firewood supplies are consumed, all things paper, and 
even fine furniture, are burned for warmth. Staying warm in large 
cities proves particularly challenging. The silent killer of carbon 
monoxide poisoning leads to accidental deaths.27 
When elevators fail to work, having navigated many flights of 
stairs in the dark to get home, many of those living in apartment 
buildings stay inside. It takes days for emergency workers to 
rescue those caught in stalled elevators when the power failed. Fire 
becomes an unchecked inferno, as desperate city dwellers create 
fires from anything that will burn. In the absence of vital 
emergency services, these fires inevitably become uncontrollable. 
First buildings, then entire neighborhoods, burn out of control. 
                                                
 27 April Kahn, What Is Carbon Monoxide Poisoning?, HEALTHLINE (Dec. 1 
2015), http://www.healthline.com/health/carbon-monoxide-
poisoning#Overview1. 
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With transportation halted, after a week or so hunger forces many 
to go into the cold in search of something to eat. 
The Midwest in February 
The weather in Chicago is almost always horrible in 
February.28 This year is no different. Many resourceful residents in 
Evanston and the more affluent suburbs use their gas fireplaces for 
cooking. However, this proves to be much easier to do in theory 
than in practice. Before long, cooking grease results in fires and 
dangerous and painful burns. Similar human misery is found 
throughout the mid-west as cities like Detroit, Cleveland, 
Columbus and St. Louis quickly stall to a frozen halt. 
In the South 
Those in warmer climates find survival moderately easier. In 
rural areas, crops and livestock provide sustenance. Many revert to 
those survival skills typical of life on the prairie two hundred years 
earlier. Even worse than the gas lines of the 1970s, service station 
fuel pumps fail for lack of electrical power, and transportation 
soon stops as cars are rendered useless due to lack of fuel. Railroad 
and truck food distribution systems in the South also fail, and the 
population soon grows hungry. Hunting and fishing moves from 
being a hobby to a necessity, and survival gains a renewed 
importance in daily life. Particularly in densely populated areas, 
household pets soon disappear, along with the residents of many 
local zoos. Animal shelters everywhere are no longer needed. Easy 
availability of firearms results in a rapid shift of vital resources 
between the “haves” and “have nots.” 
As the homeless have known for years, survival in warmer 
climates, such as in Florida, is easier during the winter. Unlike the 
frozen northeast, it is actually possible to sleep outdoors during the 
winter. As a result, many families in the northern parts of the 
United States, having abandoned all their belongings, once their 
                                                
 28 Christian Farr, Record-Breaking Cold Air Grips Chicago, NBC CHICAGO 5 
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nbcchicago.com/weather/stories/chicago-weather-
record-cold-thursday-february-18-292218691.html. 
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gas runs out now find themselves stranded in their cars somewhere 
between home and their southern destinations. 
The Importance of Water 
As those in the western part of the United States have known 
for years, water scarcity is a life or death issue. Messrs. Papa, 
Casper, and Moore state that “[s]upervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems and industrial control systems 
(ICSs) are widely used to control systems such as water supply 
systems, wastewater collection and treatment facilities. . . . 
Unfortunately, . . . these systems are vulnerable to command 
injection29 and middle-person attacks.”30 
James Fugate, now Administrator of the U.S. Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),31 developed his 
emergency management skills while serving as Florida’s State 
Coordinating Officer32 during eleven federal disasters,33 including 
the four major hurricanes impacting Florida in 2004,34 and three 
more in 2005.35 Fugate observes, “[w]e’re not a country that can 
                                                
 29 See Stephen Papa, William Casper & Tyler Moore, Securing Wastewater 
Collection Systems from Accidental and Intentional Harm: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 6 INT’L. J. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 96-97 (2013) 
(citing W. Gao, T. Morris, B. Reaves & D. Richey, On SCADA Control System 
Command and Response Injection and Intrusion Detection, IEEE ECRIME 
RESEARCHERS SUMMIT (ECRIME), 1 (Oct. 2010)). 
 30 Id. at 97 (citing Stephen Papa, William Casper & S. Nair, A Transfer 
Function based Intrusion Detection System for SCADA Systems, IEEE INT’L 
CONF. ON TECH. FOR HOMELAND SEC. 93 (Nov. 2012)). 
 31 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 
 32 Emergency Coordinating Officer Information, FLORIDA DIVISION OF 
EMERGENCY MGMT., http://www.floridadisaster.org/eco/index.asp (explaining 
the role of State Coordinating Officer). 
 33 See William Craig Fugate, FEMA: LEADERSHIP (July 15, 2016), 
https://www.fema.gov/william-craig-fugate. 
 34 2004 Hurricane Season: Five Years Later, FLORIDA DIV. OF EMERGENCY 
MGMT. (Aug. 11, 2011), http://floridadisaster.org/hurricanes/2004/. 
 35 See generally Post Disaster Development Planning (2006), 
http://www.floridadisaster.org/recovery/documents/Post%20Disaster%20Redev
elopment%20Planning%20Guidebook%20Lo.pdf. 
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go without power for a long period of time without loss of life. Our 
systems, from water treatment to hospitals to traffic control to all 
[those] things that we expect every day, our ability to operate 
without electricity is minimal.”36 The availability of water is a 
major priority at all times, particularly during a disruptive crisis 
such as a cyberattack. According to Fugate, 
That means we need to have enough power to pump, treat, 
and distribute water through the system. You have to keep 
the water system up, and you’ve gotta [sic] then focus on 
the water treatment system. Backing up sewage is just 
about as bad. Those two pieces will buy you enough time to 
look at what your alternatives are. Basically, people have to 
drink water, they have to eat, that waste has to go 
somewhere, they need medical care, they need a safe 
environment. There has to be order of law there.37 
The nation’s water supply presents numerous vulnerabilities. 
The control system of a small dam within twenty miles of New 
York City was reported to have been hacked by Iranian hackers in 
2013.38 The DOJ unsealed an indictment during March 2016 
charging a defendant who was working on behalf of the Iranian 
Government to hack into the supervisory control and data 
acquisition systems of the Rye, New York Bowman Dam, thereby 
providing the ability to control flow rates and water levels.39 
                                                
 36 See KOPPEL, supra note 6, at 117. 
 37 See id. at 118. 
 38 See Danny Yadron, Iranian Hacking Threat Emerges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 
2015, at A1. See also Robert M. Lee, Takeaways from Reports on Iranian 
Activity Against the Power Grid and a Dam, SANS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL 
SYSTEMS SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/12/21/takeaways-from-reports-on-iranian-activity-
against-the-power-grid-and-a-dam (suggesting elements of the Wall Street 
Journal article are misleading and that defenders must get smarter and keep the 
opportunity to damage infrastructure out of the hands of malicious actors); see 
also Dustin Volz & Nate Raymond, U.S. to Blame Iran for Cyber Attack on 
Small NY Dam: Sources, REUTERS: TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-cyber-idUSKCN0WC2NH; Rebecca 
Smith, Utilities Work on Strategy to Stem Blackouts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2016, 
at B1. 
 39 See Press Release, Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at Press 
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Constituting a threat to public health and safety, The Wall Street 
Journal reports that, “America’s power grid, factories, pipelines, 
bridges and dams ̶ all prime targets for digital armies ̶ are sitting 
largely unprotected on the Internet . . .  [since] [m]any of the 
computers controlling industrial systems are old and predate the 
consumer Internet. [All] 57,000 industrial-control systems, . . . 
more than any other country,”40 remain vulnerable targets. 
Communication Systems 
When the national electrical grids fail, home routers, 
televisions, most elements of the Internet of Things (“IoT”),41 and 
landline telephones become useless. After the relatively few 
commercial and home generators run out of their fuel sources, 
batteries for personal computers, iPads, iPhones, and all other 
hand-held devices soon lack connectivity and the ability to gain 
battery recharge. While public broadcasting facilities tend to have 
backup generators, cable television likely does not operate in most 
homes due to the lack of household electrical power. Car radios 
soon become the largest source of news and widespread civil-
defense-type communication, until the gasoline runs out. 
International Impact 
France and Great Britain also experience attacks similar to 
those aimed at the United States. Somehow, German technology 
                                                                                                         
Conference Announcing Seven Iranians Charged for Conducting Cyber Attacks 
Against U.S. Financial Sector (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-
remarks-press-conference-announcing-seven. 
 40 See Yadron, supra note 38, at A1, A16. 
 41 See infra note 163; see also Neil Gershenfeld & JP Vasseur, As Objects Go 
Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls)of the Internet of Things, FOREIGN AFF. 
Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 60; Anupam Chander, Robots, the Internet of Things, and 
the Future of Trade, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 465 (2015),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679028; Derek Harp, The Rise of The Things!, SANS 
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS BLOG (Oct. 12, 2015), 
https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/10/12/the-rise-of-things (last viewed Apr. 13, 
2016); Derek Harp, The Rise of the Things #2, SANS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL 
SYSTEMS BLOG (Nov. 12, 2015), https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/11/12/the-rise-
of-the-things-2. 
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prevailed, and actual damage to the German strategic infrastructure 
was modest. Global financial markets shut down in New York, 
London and Paris. As a result, the values of financial instruments 
everywhere are in free fall (based on the few remaining open 
markets). As you might expect, just like with the United States-
inducted financial meltdown of 2008,42 global counter-party 
transaction risk results in worldwide economic contagion.43 The 
global historical engines of economic growth—sales of 
automobiles44 and homes45—immediately grind to a halt, along 
                                                
 42 See generally Robert C. Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting 
Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 1 (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029262 (describing complex nature of causal factors 
of mortgage crisis resulting in lengthy healing process); GARY B. GORTON, 
SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE PANIC OF 
2007 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401882; Gary B. Gorton & Andrew 
Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale International Center 
for Finance, Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752; Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, 
Effects of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession on American Household 1s 
(Netspar Discussion Paper No. 09/2010-046, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708074; Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics and 
the U.S. Financial Collapse of 2007-08 (unpublished article) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502124. 
 43 See generally Nicole M. Boyson et al., Hedge Fund Contagion and 
Liquidity Shocks, 55 J. FIN. 1789 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=884202; 
GEERT BEKAERT ET AL., GLOBAL CRISES AND EQUITY MARKET CONTAGION 
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856881; LISA R. GOLDBERG ET AL. EXTREME 
RISK MANAGEMENT (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341363; Franklin Allen & 
Ana Babus, Networks in Finance (Wharton Fin. Inst. Center, Working Paper No. 
08-07, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094883. 
 44 See generally Pasquale Schiraldi, Automobile Replacement: A Dynamic 
Structural Approach, 42 RAND J. ECON 2 (2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350034; GERARD P. CACHON & MARCELO OLIVARES, 
DRIVERS OF FINISHED GOODS INVENTORY PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=980728; KIM HILL ET 
AL. CENTER FOR AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH, CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY TO THE ECONOMIES OF ALL FIFTY STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 
(2015), http://www.autoalliance.org/files/dmfile/2015-Auto-Industry-Jobs-
Report.pdf (reporting that over 7 million private sector U.S. jobs are supported 
by auto manufacturers, suppliers and dealers, representing annual compensation 
of $500 billion); Owen Irvine, Sales Persistence and the Reductions in GDP 
Volatility (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 05-5, 2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=760267; Valerie A. Ramey & Daniel J. Vine, Tracking 
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with the sale of consumer goods. Perhaps more than any other 
measures, international financial markets illustrate the extent to 
which markets have become interdependent, and citizens are all in 
this together.46 
Now, to reflect upon and seek insight from an important 
moment in United States history that occurred over seventy-five 
years earlier. 
III. ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR: DECEMBER 7, 1941 
“The modern American intelligence community traces its roots 
to Pearl Harbor. Everything since that attack has been designed to 
prevent strategic surprise. We were surprised on September 11. 
People wanted to know why.” 
    Gen. Michael V. Hayden 
                                                                                                         
the Source of the Decline in GDP Volatility: An Analysis of the Automobile 
Industry (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Paper No. 2005-14, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=724921. 
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Positive Budget (June 17, 2010), http://www.hbf.co.uk/media-
centre/news/view/economic-importance-of-home-building-dictates-positive-
budget/. 
 46 See generally John Beirne & Jana Gieck Bricco, Interdependence and 
Contagion in Global Asset Markets, 22 REV. INT’L ECON. 639 (2014),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476695; Francis X. Diebold & Kamil Yilmaz, 
Measuring Financial Asset Return and Volatility Spillovers, with Application to 
Global Equity Markets, 119 ECON. J. 534 (2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313919; Lawrence J. Trautman, American 
Entrepreneur in China: Potholes on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE 
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 427 (2012), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1995076 (describing co-dependency of the U.S. 
and Chinese economies); Kristin J. Forbes, The “Big C”: Identifying Contagion 
(Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w18465, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164590; Thijs D. Markwat et al. Contagion as Domino 
Effect in Global Stock Markets (Erasmus Research Inst. Of Mgmt. Report Series 
Reference No. ERS-2008-071-F&A, 2008),http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303880. 
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Former Director of the National 
Security Agency and CIA47 
 
At 7:53 a.m. Sunday morning December 7, 1941, the United 
States Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was attacked by the 
Imperial Japanese Navy.48 As a result, “[e]ighteen ships of the 
American Pacific Fleet were sunk or badly damaged, including 
eight battleships.”49 “One hundred and eighty-eight aircraft were 
destroyed (mostly on the ground) and 2,403 people were killed.”50 
The United States declared war on Japan the next day and entered 
World War II.51 
Value of Code-breaking 
Of particular relevance to this discussion is the evidence 
suggesting that better and quicker communication between various 
elements of the U.S. intelligence apparatus could have saved lives 
by providing warning of the impending attack. In 1937, building 
on the work of great American cryptanalysts such as Herbert O. 
Yardley, Laurance F. Safford, Agnes Meyer Driscoll, William F. 
Friedman, Frank B. Rowlett, Genevieve Grotjan, and many others, 
relevant “solutions of intercepted foreign messages began flowing 
to the White House.”52 
Peter Kross writes that “[i]n 1941, William Friedman had 
broken the Japanese cryptosystem called Purple, which allowed 
this country to read all the diplomatic traffic coming from Tokyo 
to its outposts around the world.”53 David Kahn writes that “[b]y 
late 1941 solutions . . . soared to 50 to 75 messages a day . . . [and] 
                                                
 47 MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE 153 (Penguin Books 2016). 
 48 SECOND WORLD WAR HISTORY, TIMELINE OF THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON 
PEARL HARBOR, http://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/attack-on-pearl-
harbor.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 49 Id. 
 50 NIGEL WEST, A THREAD OF DECEIT: ESPIONAGE MYTHS OF WORLD WAR II 
68 (Random House 1st ed.  1985). 
 51 See id. 
 52 David Kahn, The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor, FOREIGN AFF., 
Winter 1991-1992, at 44. 
 53 PETER KROSS, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR II SPIES 268 (Barricade 
Books, 1st ed.  2001). 
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a PURPLE message on July 31, 1941 from . . . Tokyo to the 
ambassador in Washington declared: There is more reason than 
ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.”54 
Moreover, 
In the first week of December, 1941, the U.S. learned that 
the Japanese government gave instructions to its 
Washington embassy to start destroying its codes, a clear 
sign that diplomatic relations were about to be broken. On 
December 6 through 7, U.S. code breakers intercepted a 14-
part message, the so-called ‘War Warning,’ which ended 
with orders to break off any further talks with the 
Americans at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time (7:30 
a.m. Hawaii time) on December 7.55 
American code-breaker and mathematics teacher Frank 
Rowlett observes, “As I look back at all the messages and other 
information available to us . . . it becomes crystal clear to me that 
this message ordering the destruction of certain of Washington’s 
codes provided the necessary evidence . . . which would make war 
between the United States and Japan a certainty.”56 Pearl Harbor 
had not been protected. As Kahn writes, “Japan had sealed all 
possible leaks. The ambassadors in Washington were not told of 
the attacks. Knowledge of it was limited in Toyko to as tight a 
circle as possible . . . No reference to a raid on Pearl Harbor ever 
went on the air, even coded.”57 In a tragedy of errors, 
“[d]isorganization and divided responsibility had cost America 
dearly.”58 It had taken fifteen and a half hours after message No. 
                                                
 54 See Kahn, supra note 52. 
 55 KROSS, supra note 53, at 269.; see also FRED B. WRIXON, CODES, CIPHERS 
& OTHER CRYPTIC & CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATION: MAKING AND BREAKING 
SECRET MESSAGES FROM HIEROGLYPHS TO THE INTERNET (1998) (observing 
that “[d]espite later criticisms of misjudgment, inaction and poor 
communication, the U.S. cryptography staffs had done their work as quickly as 
the methods and governmental limitations of that time permitted.”). 
 56 MICHAEL SMITH, THE EMPEROR’S CODES: THE BREAKING OF JAPAN’S 
SECRET CIPHERS 97 (Arcade Publishing, NY, 2001). 
 57 See Kahn, supra note 52, at 44. 
 58 See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: INSIDE THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY, AMERICA’S MOST SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 62 
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910 (ordering Japan’s Washington embassy to destroy all cipher 
equipment and codes that remained) was first intercepted (seven 
hours after the attack began) for it to finally reach “a devastated 
General Short.”59 
Congressional hearings were held by the Joint Committee on 
the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack during 1945.60 Seven 
prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack produced 
“9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318 witnesses and the 
attendant 469 exhibits.”61 The work of the Joint Committee itself 
resulted in the taking of some 15,000 pages of testimony “and a 
total of 183 exhibits received incident to an examination of 43 
witnesses.”62 The report asks why “with the almost certain 
knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the 
precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning 
of December 7—[w]hy was it possible for Pearl Harbor to 
occur?”63 
Lessons from History 
The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is not an event anyone 
under the age of seventy-five will remember from actual life 
experiences. Therefore, the knowledge most U.S. citizens have 
about Pearl Harbor comes from history books and may seem 
increasingly remote as the years pass. For many families, the oral 
histories passed down by parents and grandparents are how many 
contemporary Americans remember and learn about Pearl Harbor. 
Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee, recalls, “My dad’s mission—the mission that millions 
of other young Americans joined after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor—was to help roll back the threat posed by a radical 
                                                
 59 Id. at 61. 
 60 S. Rep. No. 79-244 at xiv, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report 
of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 253. 
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ideology.”64 Thoughtful people everywhere will do well to 
consider that, “those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.”65 
During World War II, “the increasing sophistication of the 
information carrying and processing technologies provided a 
substrate for the development of new ways of executing strategic 
operations.”66 Professor Julie Ryan observes that the 
contributions of science and . . . operations research . . . to 
leverage information in systems and engineering led the 
way . . . for the role of information. Tactical information 
victories, such as the information skirmishes that preceded 
the Battle of Midway, highlighted the increasing interaction 
of advanced communications technologies with strategic 
deception tactics for operational advantage.”67 As Professor 
Chris Bronk observes, “[h]ow states behave with regard to 
the Internet appears to matter more and more within 
international affairs . . . [and] Internet conflict may be a 
new area of international behavior falling somewhere 
between diplomacy and military action.68 
While a detailed discussion of the law of cyberwar is beyond 
the scope of this paper, any threshold inquiry must start with the 
question, “What exactly constitutes ‘warfare?’” According to 
Nineteenth century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, an act of 
war requires that aggressive or defensive conduct be (1) “violent or 
potentially violent, (2) “instrumental: [where] physical violence or 
the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the 
attacker’s will,” and (3) “attributable to one side at some point 
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during a confrontation.”69 As of 2013, “[n]o known cyberattack 
has met all three of those criteria,” observes Thomas Rid, 
contending that “the hype about everything ‘cyber’ has obscured 
three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is 
not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will 
disturb the future.”70 
In his critique of Thomas Rid’s thesis, Jarno Limnéll contends 
that by 2014 the world had become so “immersed in technology 
that activities in cyberspace [had] become inseparable from the 
every-day operations of business, education, government and the 
military. Actions online affect actions offline, and vice versa. 
Thus, far from being separate from conventional war, as Rid 
[contends], cyberwar is deeply embedded in contemporary military 
practices.”71 Moreover, “[c]yberwar, in fact, is part of the 
evolution of conventional warfare, which itself is linked to broader 
social and political change . . . .”72 
In addition to causing physical injury or death, violence can 
refer to mental abuse and different forms of deprivation. The 
academic discipline of peace studies has for decades advanced the 
concept of structural violence, such as racism and sexism. In its 
widest sense, then, violence can be found in almost any coercive 
situation. And the various attacks and activities associated with 
cyberwar, from stealing data to disrupting other governments’ 
computer systems, clearly fall within this broad category.73 
This debate, carried out in the pages of Foreign Affairs,74 
includes Thomas Rid’s concurrence that cyberspace activities are 
indeed “an inherent part of conventional warfare . . . [and that] the 
                                                
 69 See Thomas Rid, Cyberwar and Peace, FOREIGN AFF., Nov. 2013, at 77, 78. 
 70 Id. at 77; but see Ido Kilovaty, Rethinking the Prohibition on the Use of 
Force in the Light of Economic Cyber Warfare: Towards a Broader Scope of 
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 71 See Jarno Limnéll & Thomas Rid, Is Cyberwar Real?: Gauging the 
Threats, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 166. 
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 74 See Thomas Rid, supra note 69 at 77, 78. 
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psychological impact, not just the physical violence, of 
cyberattacks matter.” However, Rid disagrees with Limnéll’s 
conclusion that “waging cyberwar still remains the business of the 
armed forces alone.”75 
IV. CONTEMPORARY WARNINGS IGNORED 
“Knowing what we know now, there will be no explaining our 
inaction after the next attack.” 
Gen. Michael V. Hayden 
Former Director of the National 
Security Agency and CIA76 
 
Singer and Friedman believe that “[d]efining cyberwar need 
not be so complicated. The key elements of war in cyberspace all 
have their parallels and connections to warfare in other domains 
. . . war always has a political goal and mode (which distinguishes 
it from crime) and always has an element of violence.”77 For 
example, “the US government’s position is that to meet this 
definition of the use of force, a cyberattack would have to 
‘proximately result in death, injury or significant destruction.’ That 
is, even if conducted through cyber means, the effect must be 
physical damage or destruction.”78 
House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul reflected 
on the 9/11 Commission’s “lack of readiness;” finding, where 
                                                
 75 See Thomas Rid, Is Cyberwar Real?: Gauging the Threats/Rid Replies, 
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256 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 233 
“[t]he most important failure was one of imagination.”79 For those 
age thirty-five or younger, it may be hard to recognize that 
widespread availability of the Internet dates back only to the 1990s 
in the United States. For many other countries, infrastructure 
development would subsequently lead to increased usage rates as 
shown in “Exhibit One” below. 
Exhibit One80 
World Internet Usage and Population Statistics 
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As might be expected, discovering Internet capabilities and 
vulnerabilities proves to be a work in progress. For example, 
In 2007, U.S. soldiers took smartphone photos of a group 
of new U.S. Army helicopters parked at a base in Iraq and 
then uploaded them to the Internet. The helicopters weren’t 
classified and the photos showed no seemingly useful 
information to the enemy. But the soldiers didn’t realize the 
photos also included “geotags,” which revealed where the 
photographers had been standing. Insurgents then used 
these geotags to pinpoint and destroy four of the helicopters 
in a mortar attack. Experts now use this example to warn 
people to be more careful about what they share when 
engaged in an important activity.81 
Warnings Abound 
Despite the repeated warnings from arguably the best and 
brightest among us, actual action has proved too little too late. 
Congress finally passed five major pieces of cybersecurity 
legislation during December 2014, the first cybersecurity laws 
enacted in more than a decade.82 By the time the 2016 U.S. 
presidential campaign was underway, and following the late 2015 
terrorist strikes in Paris, San Bernardino, and Brussels, national 
security and cyber vulnerability had become topics of major 
concern to the American public.83 Dean and law professor Jon M. 
Garon84 states, “[t]he effect of these attacks has been to refocus 
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public and private officials on efforts to reduce the threat of 
terrorism . . . Perhaps the most tangible effect of this terrorist 
activity is the momentum it provided to enact the Cybersecurity 
Act of 2015.”85 Observing that “[t]he omnibus $1.1 trillion 
spending law also includes hundreds of millions of dollars to add 
cybersecurity for the IRS, EPA, and other agencies,” Dean Garon 
warns, “[t]he law provides little more than a fig leaf for privacy 
protection, so only the development of final implementing 
regulations will determine whether there are meaningful 
safeguards from the potential abuse of the data sharing provisions 
to intrude on individual privacy.”86 
General Michael V. Hayden, former director of both the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”) and Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”) warned during 2011 that 
[o]ur most pressing need is clear policy, formed by shared 
consensus, shaped by informed discussion, and created by a 
common body of knowledge. With no common knowledge, 
no meaningful discussion, and no consensus . . . the policy 
vacuum continues. This will not be easy . . . it will require 
courage; but, it is essential and should itself be the subject 
of intense discussion.87 
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) Admiral Mike Rogers characterized “cyber 
attacks as the greatest long-term threat to national security in part 
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because ‘we have yet to come to a broad policy and legal 
consensus.”’88 
Also during 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
Lynn89 stated, “If we can minimize the impact of attacks on our 
operations and attribute them quickly and definitively, we may be 
able to change the decision calculus of an attacker.”90 According to 
the Pentagon, the volume of intellectual property stolen annually 
exceeds the amount of information contained in the Library of 
Congress.91 
During April 2012, subcommittees of the U.S. House 
Committee on Homeland Security held hearings on the topic of 
“Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland.”92 On August 8, 
2012, John O. Brennan,93 at that time Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, gave his “U.S. Policy 
Toward Yemen” speech before the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Following his prepared remarks, Mr. Brennan stated that the 
consequence of the failed cybersecurity legislation is that “we’re 
not going to have enhanced authorities and capabilities of the U.S. 
government to deal with what is an increasingly serious cyber 
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challenge to our nation and to our critical infrastructure in 
particular.”94 Mr. Brennan continues: 
What we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing 
a lot of exfiltrations . . . [T]hen the next step is . . . the 
disruptive, disabling, destructive types of attacks. And so 
. . . electric grids, water treatment facilities, . . . mass 
transportation systems, . . . railways and trains, whatever - 
if those intruders get into those systems and then can 
determine how they can in fact interfere in the command 
and control systems of these systems, they . . . could . . . put 
trains onto the same tracks. They can . . . bring down 
electric grids.95 
In his prepared statement for testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Intelligence Committee, James Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence, stated, “[l]ooking back over my more than half a 
century in intelligence I have not experienced a time when we’ve 
been beset by more crises and threats around the globe. My list is 
long.”96 Chinese hackers during March 2014 successfully breached 
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management computers and stole 
highly sensitive employee files.97 By May 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Justice charged five Chinese hackers, identified as 
officers of Unit 61398 of the Third Department of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”), with cyber espionage directed 
at six American companies: Alcoa, Allegheny Technologies Inc., 
U.S. Steel, Westinghouse Electric Co., U.S. subsidiaries of 
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SolarWorld AG, and others.98 According to the DOJ, “[t]his is a 
case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese 
military and represents the first ever charges against a state actor 
for this type of hacking.”99 
By late 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh C. Johnson 
cautioned that in their daily lives, Americans are finding that 
“cyberspace is vulnerable to an ever-evolving range of threats.”100 
Secretary Johnson further observes that this vulnerability stems 
“from criminals to nation-state actors, ranging in purpose from 
identity and data theft to espionage and disruption of critical 
functions. As our Nation’s reliance on cyber networks has grown, 
incidents which impact the safety and confidence with which we 
operate online have become increasingly commonplace.”101 
By early 2015, James F. Kurose, Assistant Director of the 
National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Corporate and Information 
Science and Engineering Directorate warned that “[k]ey aspects of 
business operations, our financial systems, manufacturing supply 
chains, and military communications are tightly networked, 
integrating the economic, political, and social fabric of our global 
society.”102 Vulnerabilities can result from these interdependencies 
and “lead to a wide range of threats that challenge the security, 
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reliability, availability, and overall trustworthiness of all systems 
and resources rooted in information technology. Coupled with 
Internet adoption patterns, we are witnessing a dramatic shift in the 
size, complexity, and diversity of cyber security attacks.”103 Before 
Congress, Kurose testified that the United States: 
Needs to continue its investments in game-changing 
research if our cyber systems are to be trustworthy now and 
in the future. As you know, every day, we learn about more 
sophisticated and dangerous attacks. Why is the cyber 
security challenge so hard? The general answer is that 
attacks and defenses co-evolve: a system that was secure 
yesterday might no longer be secure tomorrow. More 
specific responses to this question include: 
• The technology base of our critical infrastructure systems 
is frequently updated to improve functionality, availability, 
and/or performance. New systems introduce new 
vulnerabilities (unknowable in the lab) that need new 
defenses when put into practice. 
• The environments in which our computing systems are 
rapidly developed and deployed, and the functionality that 
they provide are also not static. With entirely new 
computing models/platforms, like cloud and mobile 
computing, come new content and function, which in turn 
create new opportunities and incentives for attack and 
disruption. 
• As the automation of complex system interdependencies 
comes to pervade our critical infrastructure, new kinds of 
cascading vulnerabilities can be accidentally created and 
subsequently discovered in these systems, including the 
electric power grid, automated transportation networks, and 
robotic medical systems. 
• The sophistication of attackers is increasing as well as 
their sheer number and the specificity of their targets. 
• As information and systems are increasingly connected, 
and are increasingly composed of software and hardware 
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produced by global supply chains, the opportunities for 
malicious insiders to cause damage increases, and the risks 
of information leaks multiply. 
• As more systems and data become accessible, 
information that was once low risk becomes high risk 
through correlation that was unimaginable only a few years 
ago. 
• Achieving system trustworthiness is not purely a 
technology problem. System developers, purchasers, 
operators and users all have a role to play in system 
security, and ways to incentivize positive behaviors are 
required. Security mechanisms that are not convenient will 
be circumvented; security mechanisms that are difficult to 
understand will be ignored or misinterpreted. Indeed, cyber 
security is a multi-dimensional challenge, requiring 
expertise in computer science, mathematics, economics, 
behavioral sciences, and education.104 
In Congressional testimony given on March 4, 2015, Navy  
Admiral Michael S. Rogers, commander of the U.S. Cyber 
Command and director of the National Security Agency, stated: 
Every conflict in the world today has a cyber dimension 
. . . . The most worrisome of these campaigns are state-
sponsored, persistent, and worldwide in scope. They are 
aimed at governments, non-profits, and corporations 
wherever they might be accruing intellectual capital that the 
attackers believe could be valuable, whether for re-sale or 
passage to competing firms and industries . . . . We see 
states developing capabilities and attaining accesses for 
potential hostilities, perhaps with the idea of enhancing 
deterrence or as a beachhead for future cyber sabotage. 
Private security researchers over the last year have reported 
on numerous malware finds in the industrial control 
systems of energy sector organizations . . . . We believe 
potential adversaries might be leaving cyber fingerprints on 
our critical infrastructure partly to convey a message that 
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our homeland is at risk if tensions ever escalate toward 
military conflict.105 
Time and time again, specific warnings have been presented to   
Congress about what needs to be done by government and private 
organizations to increase their cybersecurity defenses. Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter cautioned, “The same Internet that enables 
Wikipedia also allows terrorists to learn how to build a bomb. And 
the same technologies we use to target cruise missiles and jam 
enemy air defenses can be used against our own forces—and 
they’re now available to the highest bidder.”106 Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr. 
said, “Today, 96 percent of our most advanced electronic warfare 
systems are assembled with commercially available components. 
We only add 4 percent worth of ‘special sauce.”107 That means 
adversaries can quickly copy advanced U.S. systems with globally 
sourced components.”108 Ash Carter warned that “[w]hether it’s in 
the cloud, infrared cameras, or the GPS signals that provide 
navigation for ride-sharing apps, but also for aircraft carriers and 
our smart bombs—our reliance on technology has led to real 
vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit.”109 
Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, explains nation-states, 
terrorist, and criminal networks are “increasing their cyber 
operations. Low-cost and global proliferation of malware have 
lowered barriers to entry and made it easier for smaller malicious 
actors to strike in cyberspace. We’re also seeing blended state-and-
non-state threats in cyber . . . which complicates potential 
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responses for us and for others.”110 The long list of top U.S. 
government officials echoing these warnings includes Francis X. 
Taylor, Under Secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
at the Department of Homeland Security. He stated, “[T]errorist 
groups operating in permissive environments present a significant 
security threat to the U.S. and our allies . . . . [T]he terrorist threat 
is fluid and cannot be associated with one group, race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, or geographic location.”111 And, as DHS’s 
Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and 
Communications, stated, “[U]ltimately, there exists no perfect 
cyber defense, and persistent adversaries will find ways to infiltrate 
networks in both government and the private sector.”112 
Cyberattack: A National Security Issue 
“The next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a 
cyberattack that cripples America’s electrical grid and its security 
and financial systems,” observed Central Intelligence Agency 
Director Leon Panetta in his June 9, 2011 confirmation hearing for 
the post of Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.113 A Wall Street Journal article titled Cyber Combat: 
Act of War, observed “[t]he Pentagon’s first formal cyber strategy 
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. . . represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing world in 
which a hacker could pose as significant a threat to U.S. nuclear 
reactors, subways or pipelines as a hostile country’s military.” 114 
The analogy of a cyberattack scenario to Pearl Harbor is not 
unique to Leon Panetta or this article. Nearly two decades ago, 
defense analysis professor John Arquilla describes “the first global 
cyberwar, where the enemy is invisible, the battles virtual, and the 
casualties all too real.”115 Arquilla’s fictional day-by-day detailed 
depiction of a three-week-long cyber assault and its precipitating 
events remains a great read, and with very few exceptions, is just 
as contemporary today. In 2012, Mike McConnell, former director 
of national intelligence during President George W. Bush’s 
administration, warned, “the United States could not ‘wait for the 
cyber equivalent of the World Trade Centers.’”116 
The USA PATRIOT Act117 defines critical infrastructure as 
“systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health and safety, or any combination of 
those matters.”118 Presidential Decision Directive 63 (or PDD-63) 
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identified the requirement to protect the following critical 
infrastructures: “information and communications; banking and 
finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, 
rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement 
services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; 
public health services; electric power, oil and gas production; and 
storage.”119 The following four activities controlled by the federal 
government were specifically identified by PDD-63: “internal 
security and federal law enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign 
affairs; and national defense.” 120 During February 2013, the 
Obama Administration issued PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience thus superseding HSPD-7.121 
By 2016, Jessica Stern’s chilling synopsis is that “[c]ivil war, 
sectarian tensions, and state failure in the Middle East and Africa 
ensure that Islamist terrorism will continue its spread in those 
regions  ̶  and most likely in the rest of the world as well.”122 The 
emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (known as ISIS) is 
perhaps the most troubling threat to world peace, “a protean Salafi 
jihadist organization whose brutal violence, ability to capture and 
hold territory, significant financial resources, and impressive 
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strategic acumen make it a threat unlike any other the United 
States has faced in the contemporary era.”123 
Going Dark 
Central to creating effective cyberattack policy is addressing 
the tension surrounding the debate about privacy. FBI Director 
James B. Comey124 describes the controversial problem known as 
“going dark” to the Senate Judiciary Committee as “the growing 
challenges to public safety and national security that have eroded 
our ability to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant 
to a court order or warrant.”125 In testimony given to the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Director Comey observes that 
we “live in a technologically driven society and just as private 
industry has adapted to modern forms of communication so too 
have the terrorists. Unfortunately, changing forms of internet 
communication are quickly outpacing laws and technology 
designed to allow for the lawful intercept of communication 
content.”126 
Law Professor Peter Swire reports that the Review Group, 
having full awareness of concerns about the “going dark” 
controversy, “sharply criticized any attempt to introduce 
vulnerabilities into commercially available products and services, 
and found that even temporary vulnerabilities should be authorized 
only after administration-wide scrutiny.”127 Moreover, based on 
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substantial experiences of the Review Group and following top-
secret briefings, it was the Group’s clear and unanimous 
recommendation that strong encryption be encouraged, finding 
“these policies would best fight cyber-crime, improve 
cybersecurity, build trust in the global communications 
infrastructure, and promote national security.”128 
V. ROADMAP TO TRAGEDY 
“We already face a global threat from electronic warfare 
systems capable of jamming satellite communications systems and 
global navigation space systems.”  
Hon. James R. Clapper 
    Director of National Intelligence 
    February 9, 2016 129   
  
Cyber attacks continue to escalate and progressively appear 
war like in nature. 
Governance of Cyber Conflict 
Continued rapid worldwide adoption of the Internet, mobile 
phone service, technological advances, and increased 
interconnectivity results in needed accommodations in law for acts 
of cyber conflict.130 Kristen Eichensehr contends that nation states 
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have been required to answer the following three fundamental 
questions for other domains, and they must now be answered for 
cyber: “(1) what role, if any, private parties should play in 
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governance; (2) how the domain should be governed (no 
governance system, treaty, or norms); and (3) whether and how to 
regulate military activities in the domain.”131 Professor Eichensehr 
suggests that the requirements for cyber may differ in important 
ways from the older schematic of “multilateral governance, 
governance by treaty, and some level of demilitarization.”132 Calls 
for greater cyber deterrence among nations also make for a 
controversial contemporary debate.133 The tension between 
national security requirements and privacy issues remain tense.134 
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The Attribution Problem 
In the case of many cyberattacks, attribution with certainty to 
the source of attack is problematic. Brandon Valeriano and Ryan 
Maness state that “one of the advantages of a cyber dispute is 
deniability . . . For some cases, attribution is easy; for example, 
India and Pakistan have been immersed in ‘tit for tat’ cyber 
incidents for some time and it is fairly clear that actions in this 
arena are state sponsored.”135 Professor Michael J. Glennon 
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observes that “[i]f cyber activity and its sponsor are concealed . . . 
and verification and compliance is impossible, so too is deterrence 
and effective legal regulation. No verifiable international 
agreement can regulate the covert writing or storage of computer 
code useful for launching a clandestine cyber attack.”136 The 
anonymous nature of the internet complicates effective deterrence 
because “[t]o attribute a cyber attack to a state, it’s necessary to 
establish what computer was used, who was sitting at the computer 
(if it’s not government owned), and what government or 
organization that person worked for . . . concealment is baked into 
the structure of the Internet [and not feasibly] . . . eliminated.”137 
Clear and Present Danger 
Today’s information warfare campaigns utilize malicious 
information gathering software, denial of service attacks, some 
highly sophisticated targeted cyberweapons like Stuxnet, and 
espionage and data exfiltration attacks.138 Julie J.C.H. Ryan warns 
that “[t]he use of malicious software to encrypt large blocks of data 
for denial is possible and could have devastating consequences, 
removing en masse capabilities for control and coordination as 
relevant information is rendered inaccessible.”139 
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Director of National Intelligence James Clapper states that 
“2014 saw, for the first time, destructive cyber attacks carried out 
on U.S. soil by nation state entities, marked first by the Iranian 
attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation . . . and the 
North Korean attack against Sony in November [2014].”140 While 
many believe that both Iran and North Korea possess lesser 
technical capabilities than either China or Russia, “these 
destructive attacks demonstrate that Iran and North Korea are 
motivated and unpredictable cyber actors.”141 Recently, “[n]onstate 
actors have increasingly used information technologies to create 
the connectivity, and thus the unifying motivation, for their 
community of influence. Virtual non-state actors, such as 
Anonymous, have emerged that exist in online venues and operate 
primarily in the information domain.”142 Larisa Breton concludes, 
“virtual non-state actors have the potential to affect both warfare 
and governance.”143 
FBI Director James Comey testified before Congress on July 8, 
2015 that “millions and millions of U.S. government background-
investigation records—dating back 20 years—were stolen by 
hackers who broke into the Office of Personnel Management’s 
(“OPM”) network.”144 Chairman Jason Chaffetz of the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform characterized 
the OPM breach as “one of the biggest data breaches in our 
country’s history . . . [and remarked that] [o]nly the imagination 
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limits what a foreign adversary could do with detailed information 
about a federal employee’s education, career, health, family, 
friends, neighbors, and personal habits.”145 Jane Harmon is a 
former nine-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
representing California and served as the Ranking Democratic 
Member on the U.S. House Intelligence Committee from 2002 to 
2006. Former Congresswoman Harmon wrote during 2015 that, 
“[s]urprise developments . . . have blindsided U.S. officials. The 
disintegration of Syria, the Boston Marathon bombing, the 
precipitous rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and . . . (“ISIS”), the 
systematic hacking of U.S. computer networks—in one way or 
another, all caught Washington flat-footed.”146 
Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee observed that “in 2003, a 
cascading failure across the grid in the Northeast left almost 50 
million people without power, many for days. One federal study 
identified nine critical substations that could be disabled and 
potentially bring down the entire U.S. grid for more than 18 
months.”147 In his July 22, 2015 Congressional testimony, Former 
Director of Central Intelligence, Ambassador R. James Woolsey, 
warned that: 
Ignorance of the military doctrines of potential adversaries 
and a failure of strategic imagination is setting America up 
for an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] Pearl Harbor that could 
easily be avoided-if we would only heed that terrorist 
sabotage of electric grids and cyber-attacks are early 
warning indicators. In fact, in the military doctrines, 
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planning, and exercises of Russia, China, North Korea and 
Iran, nuclear EMP attack is the ultimate weapon in an all-
out cyber operation aimed at defeating nations by blacking-
out their electric grids and other critical infrastructures.148 
Aircraft control system vulnerabilities create the possibility of 
targeted air system grinding to a halt, resulting in exclusive air 
supremacy for an aggressor and a significant change in the balance 
of power.149 Reports from The Washington Post during early 2016 
depict hackers creating a Ukraine power outage during the holiday 
season, creating a troubling escalation of digital attacks.150 Michael 
J. Assante contends that “[a] small number of sources in Russia 
and Ukraine indicate the electrical outage was caused by a cyber 
attack, specifically a virus from an outside source. I am skeptical 
as the referenced outage has been hard to substantiate and the 
cause surfaced relatively quickly.”151 Assante is dubious because 
“normally, determining root cause analysis of an incident takes 
time especially when it pertains to activity on the network.”152 
Elsewhere, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine 
(“CERT-UA”) “confirms reports that the BlackEnergy espionage 
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Trojan—and KillDisk wiper malware—infected systems of the 
hacked energy supplier, which suffered a three-hour electricity 
blackout on Dec. 23, [2015] after multiple electrical substations 
went offline, leaving about 1.4 million homes in the country’s 
western Ivano-Frankivsk region without power.”153 
Cyber “War Games” Conducted 
In July 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
“Pentagon, Department of Homeland Security, National Security 
Agency and a host of other agencies joined British officials and a 
number of private companies for a three-week cyberwar game, 
testing 14 teams on a range of simulated attacks on two 
continents.”154 Practicing crisis situation scenarios is a basic 
strategy of good enterprise governance.155 These types of practice 
exercises and vulnerability testing often produce valuable lessons. 
Impact of Technological Change 
According to Frank Cilluffo, the growing pace of cyberattacks 
“is magnified by the speed at which technologies continue to 
evolve and by the fact that our adversaries continue to adapt their 
tactics, techniques and procedures in order to evade and defeat our 
prevention and response measures.”156 This means that the 
likelihood of cyberattack increases on almost a daily basis due to 
technological advances in big data;157 brain-computer interfaces;158 
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code and encryption;159 cloud computing;160 cyber weapons;161 
face recognition surveillance;162 internet of things;163 military 
weapons;164 mobile internet;165 quantum computing;166 sensor 
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devices;167 Wi-Fi and wireless;168 and new technological threats to 
the global financial system.169 Charles J. Dunlap warns that when 
nation state actors engage in the increased proliferation of 
malicious computer viruses turned loose “on a technology-
dependent high-tech society may be as devastating to 
noncombatants as many of their biological namesakes.”170 Thomas 
Friedman explains it this way: “But today, when individuals can 
easily access all the tools of collaboration and superempower 
themselves . . . individuals do not need to control a country to 
threaten large numbers of other people. The small can act very big 
today and pose a serious danger to world order—without the 
instruments of a state.”171 
Encryption and the “Least Trusted Country” Problem 
Stewart A. Baker and Nathan A. Sales state, “[i]nformation 
policy is a central front in the war on terrorism.172 In July 2015 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, law professor 
Peter Swire talked about the vulnerability known as the “least 
trusted country” problem, where “[i]f one country sets limits on 
encryption, then cross-border communications that comply with 
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that country’s laws will have that vulnerability. If one party . . . 
uses compromised encryption as required in that country, then 
those globally who communicate with that country will have their 
communications compromised as well.”173 
This vulnerability is a particular problem because of lax data 
security in many other parts of the world where U.S.-generated 
data traffic either passes through or is destined. The significant 
growth in either the development or maintenance of computer code 
via business process outsourcing (“BPO”) by American companies 
to businesses located in such countries as India may be a critical 
weakness leading up to a cyber Pearl Harbor.174 
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
“Terrorists will almost certainly continue to benefit . . . from a 
new generation of recruits proficient in information technology, 
social media, and online research. Some terrorists will look to use 
these technologies to increase the speed of their communications, 
the availability of their propaganda, and ability to collaborate with 
new partners. They will easily take advantage of widely available, 
free encryption technology, mobile-messaging applications, the 
dark web, and virtual environments to pursue their objectives.” 
Hon. James R. Clapper 
    Director of National Intelligence 
    February 9, 2016 175 
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Professor Julie Ryan contends that among the number of 
serious geopolitical questions that must be considered include what 
specific cyberspace conduct “rise[s] to the level of [an] act of 
armed aggression? Does it matter if these acts are carried out by 
nations, corporations, ad hoc groups, or individuals? [A]re the 
asymmetries associated with information warfare so great that 
unleashing the potential might in fact redraft the geopolitical 
landscape?”176 Despite whether their policies toward the Internet 
are characterized as “open or closed,” governments worldwide 
continue to face “inherent perpetual difficulty in regulating online 
spaces.”177 Melissa Hathaway, Chris Demchak, Jason Kerben, 
Jennifer McArdle and Francesca Spidalieri observe that: 
A sound National Cyber Security Strategy . . . must be 
actionable. Today, the prime topics reflected in most 
strategies include: outlining organizational and positional 
authority within the government; fostering awareness and 
education among citizens; building an incident and crisis 
management response capability; expanding law 
enforcement’s capacity to deal with the rate of cyber 
crimes; facilitating private-public partnerships and 
developing trusted information sharing exchanges; and 
                                                                                                         
NAL.pdf (statement of Hon. James R. Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence). 
 176 Julie J. C. H. Ryan, LEADING ISSUES IN INFORMATION WARFARE AND 
SECURITY RESEARCH, xii (2012). 
 177 Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. 
ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 341, 377 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548561 
(citing Robert Faris & Rebekah Heacock Jones, Platforms and Policy, INTERNET 
MONITOR 2014: REFLECTIONS ON THE DIGITAL WORLD 28, 29 (Urs Gasser et al. 
eds., 2014)); Hitoshi Nasu & Helen Trezise, Cyber Security in the Asia Pacific, 
ANU College of Law Research Paper 2015 Series 2, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700388; Nicholas 
Tsagourias and Russell Buchan (eds), Research Handbook on International Law 
and Cyberspace 446–64 (Edward Elgar, 2015); Nazli Choucri, Explorations in 
Cyber International Relations: A Research Collaboration of MIT and Harvard 
University (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727414. 
282 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 233 
marshaling resources toward a R&D and innovation 
agenda.178 
Daniel J. and Julie J.C.H. Ryan observe “[m]ost corporations 
would no more consider the need to develop, and pay for, the 
technologies, practices and procedures that would be needed to 
defend against a state-sponsored INFOWAR attack than they 
would develop the technologies, practices and procedures to 
protect themselves against a strategic exchange of thermonuclear 
weapons.”179 Robert Faris and Rebekah Heacock Jones observe 
that during the past decade all governmental 
Core regulatory challenges have changed in degree but not 
in kind; issues of scale, jurisdiction, and attribution, which 
are tied to the ability to conduct surveillance, complicate 
any efforts to regulate online activity. The ability to 
identify individuals associated with online activity 
facilitates regulation . . . and mechanisms that allow 
individuals to cloak their identity or to take refuge outside 
of their government’s jurisdiction reduce regulatory 
effectiveness.180 
In their 2014 report by The President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Richard A. 
Clarke, Michael J. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein & Peter Swire state 
that: 
When public officials acquire foreign intelligence 
information, they seek to reduce risks, above all risks to 
national security. The challenge, of course, is that multiple 
risks are involved. Government must consider all of those 
risks, not a subset, when it is creating sensible safeguards. 
In addition to reducing risks to national security, public 
officials must consider four other risks: 
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· Risks to privacy; 
· Risks to freedom and civil liberties, on the Internet 
and elsewhere; 
· Risks to our relationships with other nations; and 
· Risks to trade and commerce, including 
international commerce.181  
Defense Secretary Ash Carter says, “[d]ozens of militaries 
are developing cyber forces, . . . and because stability depends 
on avoiding miscalculation that could lead to escalation, 
militaries must talk to each other and understand each other’s 
abilities.”182 Admiral Michael S. Rogers observes: 
I liken our historical moment to the situation that 
confronted the U.S. early in the Cold War, when it became 
obvious that the Soviet Union and others could build 
hydrogen bombs and the superpower competition showed 
worrying signs of instability. We rapidly learned that we 
needed a nuclear force that was deployed across the three 
legs of the triad and underpinned by robust command and 
control mechanisms, far-reaching intelligence, and policy 
structures including a declared deterrence posture. Building 
these nuclear forces and the policy and support structures 
around them took time and did not cause a nuclear war or 
make the world less safe. On the contrary, it made 
deterrence predictable, helped to lower tensions, and 
ultimately facilitated arms control negotiations. While the 
analogy to cyberspace is not exact, it seems clear that our 
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nation must continue to commit time, effort, and resources 
to understanding our historical situation and building cyber 
military capabilities, along with the “whole-of-nation” 
structures and partnerships they work among. Just as we 
fashioned a formidable nuclear capability that served us 
through the Cold War and beyond, I am confident in our 
ability to keep pace with adversaries who are determined to 
control “their” corners of cyberspace, to exfiltrate our 
intellectual property, and to disrupt the functioning of our 
institutions. They are every bit as determined, creative, and 
persistent in these efforts as the Soviet leaders we 
contained during the Cold War, and unfortunately we see 
few hints they will act more responsibly in cyberspace. 
Thus we must commit to the long-term goal of building a 
truly open, secure cyberspace governed collaboratively by 
many stakeholders, while we remain prepared for crises 
and contingencies that can arise along the way—just as we 
do in every other domain.183 
By the end of 2015, Harvard’s Jessica Stein observes, 
“[l]ooking forward, cyberterrorism and cyberwar will likely pose a 
more serious threat to Americans’ well-being than conventional 
terrorist violence, and government surveillance is and will remain 
an essential weapon against cyberattacks.”184 
During early 2016, President Barack Obama, while announcing 
his new cyber budget provisions and cybersecurity initiatives, 
stated: 
My budget includes more than $19 billion for 
cybersecurity, which is up by more than one-third. And 
with this plan, we intend to modernize federal IT by 
replacing and retiring outdated systems that are vulnerable 
to attack…  one of the biggest gaps between the public 
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sector and the private sector is in our IT space, and it makes 
everybody’s information vulnerable. Our Social Security 
system still runs on a Cobalt platform that dates back to the 
‘60s. Our IRS systems are archaic…  If we’re going to 
really secure those in a serious way, then we need to 
upgrade them . . .185 
More Lessons from History 
Jason Healey is a former Director of Cyber Policy during the 
Obama Administration and cautions that “[c]yber history has been 
forgotten, ignored as irrelevant, or intentionally falsified . . . 
[while] the issues faced today are largely reflected in, or are 
exactly the same as, those faced by the previous generation.”186 
Today, recruiting skilled talent to defend against cyber attack 
remains a challenge.187 However, as Mr. Healey observes about 
cyber defenders, 
As each new wave of entrants, every five years or so, feels 
that they are the pioneers. Since they are not taught any 
history of their field, many accordingly fail to distinguish 
between what is actually new versus what is just new to 
them. In addition, cyberspace not only has many 
characteristics which are non-intuitive to (older) 
policymakers, but it seems to be forever changing…  
Admittedly, the field is still emerging rapidly, and we are at 
the beginning of the ‘cyber age.’ But that is no reason to 
ignore the useful lessons of its current history.188 
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For perspective and insight as to vulnerability causation, let us 
now harken back almost seventy years to findings from the Joint 
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack as they 
point to “supervisory, administrative, and organizational 
deficiencies which existed in our Military and Naval 
establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor.”189 After careful 
consideration of evidence produced during its investigation, the 
Joint Committee produced a series of principles “for the reason 
that, by their self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they 
were ignored. . . . [And] in the earnest hope that something 
constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national 
defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7, 
1941.”190 As our strategy evolves to detect, mitigate, and fight 
cyberattacks, reflection upon these principles, and how, if at all, 
they may differ in today’s rapidly changing technological 
environment, may prove helpful. The principles are as follows: 
1. Operational and intelligence work requires 
centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of 
responsibility. 
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for 
granted in the alerting of subordinates. 
3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given 
information should always be resolved in favor of 
supplying the information. 
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders 
entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official 
mandate is properly exercised. 
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed 
with closest supervision. 
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be 
insured through repetition. 
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7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place 
where sudden and decisive action are of the essence. 
8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence 
in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service 
and centralization of responsibility in competent officials. 
9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is 
fatal. There should never be any hesitancy in asking for 
clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters 
that are in doubt. 
10. There is no substitute for imagination and 
resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence 
officials. 
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, 
forthrightness, and appropriateness. 
12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of 
information received and every effort should be made to 
insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true 
meaning of the original. 
13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the 
exigencies of unusual situations. 
14. Restrictions of highly confidential information to a 
minimum number of officials, while often necessary, 
should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of 
the organization. 
15. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-
evident. 
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the 
benefit of significant information. 
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail 
with his organization should forfeit his responsibility. 
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by 
preparation for any eventuality. 
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never 
countermand an official instruction. 
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20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any 
organization. 
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be 
accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the 
latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more 
agencies. 
22. No considerations should be permitted as an excuse for 
failure to perform a fundamental task. 
23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates 
adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should 
keep their superiors informed. 
24. The administrative organization of any establishment 
must be designed to locate failures and to assess 
responsibility. 
25. In a well-balanced organization there is close 
correlation of responsibility and authority.191 
A major difference between the environment surrounding Pearl 
Harbor and the cyber domain, according to Harvard National 
Security Fellow Steven Anderson, “is the fact that the military 
owns less than 15% of the cyberspace environment . . . so 
integration between the military/public/private sectors is absolutely 
critical if the nation is going to prevent an event as depicted earlier 
in this paper . . . let alone how to respond if/when it does occur.”192 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“Intelligence is all about the future and is designed to enable 
action in the face of continuing doubt.” 
Gen. Michael V. Hayden 
Former Director of the National 
Security Agency and CIA193 
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With the power to wreak havoc on global economic and 
political stability, cyber issues remain likely the greatest single 
threat to modern civilization. Now, just as in the days and weeks 
immediately preceding the 1941 attack against the United States at 
Pearl Harbor, all the necessary warning signs are there. Enemies 
have probed and fully mapped the data systems of America’s 
important corporations and institutions. The future of the United 
States, represented by its intellectual property, has systematically 
been stolen by its adversaries. Initial sounding of the alarm, “the 
hackers are coming; the hackers are coming” may have already 
faded from deaf ears. However, beware, the hackers are here! The 
hackers are here! 
 
